Community Update

New Conflict-of-Interest Rules Under HB 797 Raise the Stakes for Association Directors

By: Bryony G. Swift

Florida House Bill 797 (2026) significantly revises Section 617.0832 of the Florida Statutes, creating a modernized framework for addressing director conflict-of-interest transactions. For condominium and homeowners’ associations, these changes are particularly important because Sections 718.3027 and 720.3033 expressly require association boards to comply with Chapter 617’s conflict-of-interest standards.

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The HOA Architectural Control Statute Has Again Been Amended

By: Yeline Goin

The 2026 legislative session did not result in an abundance of legislation amending the statutes governing condominium, cooperative, and homeowners’ associations. One exception is an amendment to Section 720.3035, Florida Statutes, involving architectural control covenants and homeowners’ associations (“HOAs”), which was adopted as part of House Bill 803 (HB 803), and which became effective on July 1, 2026.

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Condominium Association Preemptive Rights Explained: What Is a Right of First Refusal and Is It the Same as a Right of Approval?

By: Jose Luis Baloyra

Florida condominiums are often created with provisions granting a right of first refusal (ROFR) and/or a right to approve a future purchaser or occupant within the declaration of condominium. Section 718.104(5), Florida Statutes, provides that the declaration of condominium, as originally recorded or as amended, may include covenants and restrictions regarding the transfer of units “permitted by law with reference to real property.” Under Florida law, the right of first refusal is deemed reasonable if based on market price or appraised value.

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Welleby Condominium Ass’n One, Inc. v. William Lyon Co.
522 So.2d 35 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)

By: Joseph Markovich

Whether unimproved land shown in condominium documents may be assessed as if it were a completed condominium unit is the issue addressed by THIS CASE. The dispute involved what lawyers in this field sometimes refer to as “phantom units” – property identified in condominium documents as contemplated units, but on which no dwelling or apartment has actually been constructed. After the association filed claims of lien against eleven parcels owned by The William Lyon Company for unpaid maintenance assessments, the developer defended on the ground that the unbuilt parcels were not assessable “condominium units” or “condominium parcels” under the declaration. To resolve the dispute, the Fourth District Court of Appeal examined the Condominium Act provisions in effect when the declaration was recorded and compared them with the wording of the declaration itself.

The court’s analysis turned on the statutory definition of “unit” then in effect. Section 711.03(15), Florida Statutes, later recodified as Section 718.103(16) and currently codified at Section 718.103(31), provided that a unit could consist of improvements, land, or land and improvements together, as specified in the declaration. That statutory language made the declaration critical. The declaration did not impose assessments generally against all land shown in the condominium documents. Instead, it imposed assessments against “condominium parcels,” which it defined as an apartment together with its appurtenant share of the common elements. The declaration further defined an apartment or unit as an individual private dwelling.

Because the developer’s property consisted only of vacant, unimproved land, the court concluded that it was not an assessable condominium parcel under the declaration. The association therefore had no legal authority to levy assessments against the property, and the liens were declared illegal, null, and void. Importantly, THIS CASE was not a broad holding that phantom units can never be assessed. For example, in the 1986 appellate court decision Hyde Park Condo. Ass’n v. Estero Island Real Estate, Inc., 486 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), the court held that unimproved parcels constituted assessable units under a different statutory framework and different governing documents. By contrast, THIS CASE was a declaration-driven decision: under the statutory definition of “unit” applicable when the declaration was recorded, a unit could consist of land, improvements, or both, as specified in the declaration; because the declaration defined the assessable interest as a dwelling it excluded raw, unconstructed land.

For associations, developers, and purchasers of undeveloped condominium property, the lesson from THIS CASE is that assessment obligations may depend on when the declaration was recorded, which version of the Condominium Act applies, and the precise words used to define “unit” or “condominium parcel.” That lesson is especially important because Florida courts have continued to address related phantom-unit issues, including whether declaration language includes raw land within the definition of a unit, whether ambiguous declaration language precludes summary judgment, whether unbuilt units are treated differently for ordinary assessments than for deferred maintenance reserves, and whether statutory changes alter the analysis. Given the complex nature of these disputes, those involved should retain the services of an attorney qualified to provide proper guidance.